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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
 The present case is a consolidation of two cases brought by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.  
The first case (Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-00132) was brought by the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants against ROBERT TALBOT and MICHELE TALBOT, (hereafter the 
“Talbots”) who are the neighbors of the Plaintiffs/Appellants.  This case is about a boundary line 
dispute.  The Talbots filed an Answer and a Counterclaim to quiet title to the boundary line.   
The second case (Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-00164) was brought by the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants against PAUL PARKER and SAUNDRA PARKER (hereafter the 
“Parkers”), who sold the home to the Plaintiffs/Appellants that they currently live in next to the 
Talbots.  This case raised a Warranty of Title claim and a damage claim for mold, water damage, 
fraud and failure to disclose to which the Parkers filed an Answer denying all 
Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claims.  Plaintiffs/Appellants later voluntarily dismissed the damage claim 
for mold, water damage, fraud and failure to disclose leaving only the Warranty of Title claim.1 
 These two cases were consolidated on April 19, 2016 into the present litigation because 
the boundary line issue is mutual between the Plaintiffs/Appellants and the Talbots and Parkers.2   
 During the course of the litigation the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a Motion to Disqualify 
the counsel representing the Talbots and the Parkers on the basis of what the 
                                                 
1 R. at 638. 
2 R. at 281.   
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Plaintiffs/Appellants claim is a conflict of interest based on a Rule of Professional Conduct.3  
The Talbots and the Parkers filed an Opposition and also made oral arguments at the hearing on 
the Motion to Disqualify.  On April 19, 2016, the District Court held a hearing and then entered a 
Minute Entry and Order denying Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Motion to Disqualify the counsel 
representing the Talbots and the Parkers.4   
 On August 15, 2016 the Talbots and Parkers filed an Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Brief in support of summary judgment asking the District Court to enter an order 
establishing the boundary line between the Talbots and Plaintiffs/Appellants and seeking to 
dismiss all claims raised by the Plaintiffs/Appellants against the Talbots and the Parkers.5  The 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a late Cross Motion for Summary Judgment6 which was opposed by 
the Talbots and the Parkers for being late.7  The parties filed various Responses and Replies as 
well as various Motions to Strike.8 
The District Court denied Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the basis that it was filed late with no good cause shown.9  The District Court then entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Talbots’ and Parkers’ Amended Motion for Summary 
                                                 
3 R. at 264-269. 
4 R. at 281-283. 
5 R. at 357-358, and at 359-383 respectively.  
6 R. at 523-525. 
7 R. at 571-581. 
8 R. at 359-383, and 523-615.   
9 R. at 616-617, and 638. 
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Judgment in favor of the Talbots and against the Plaintiffs/Appellants.10  On October 12, 2016, 
the District Court entered a final Judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.11   
 On October 13, 2016, Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a Motion for New Trial or to Alter or 
Amend Judgment12 with an accompanying Brief.13  However, the only reason for doing this was 
that the Plaintiffs/Appellants argued that the District Court had not addressed the Warranty of 
Title issue that was pending against the Parkers in its original Memorandum Decision and 
Order.14  The Plaintiffs/Appellants never asked the District Court to alter or amend its October 
12, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order.  On December 15, 2016, the District Court entered 
its Memorandum Decision and Order on the Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend 
Judgment and ruled against the Plaintiffs/Appellants and in favor of the Parkers.15   
 On January 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed an appeal on “the Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated December 15, 2016, by the Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding, and all 
preceding orders and rulings.”16   
 
                                                 
10 R. at 637-650. 
11 R. at 651-652.   
12 R. at 654-655.   
13 R. at 656-671. 
14 R. at 656-671. 
15 R. at 724-730. 
16 R. at 731-734.   
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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS  
 The following statement of facts evidences that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact that would preclude the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Talbots 
and the Parkers.  The Plaintiffs/Appellants have failed to present any evidence that disputes the 
following facts which are all supported by the record before this Court.  These facts, with 
references to the record, are as follows: 
 On or about April 5, 1972, Myrtle Ransom deeded certain real property located in 
Franklin County, Idaho to Howard Almond.  This transfer of real property was made by warranty 
deed, a true and correct copy of which is attached to Plaintiffs’ Complaint as Exhibit “A” which 
is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully.17 
On or about July 2, 1979 Howard Almond and Laura Almond deeded the real property to 
Craig and to Sue Shaffer by warranty deed recorded on July 11, 1979, as Franklin County 
Recorder’s Instrument No. 150231, which was later modified by that certain correction warranty 
deed recorded on October 2, 1981 as Franklin County Recorder’s Instrument No. 157161.  (See 
Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibits “B” and “C” and the Affidavit of Craig Shaffer, (hereafter Shaffer 
Affidavit).)18 
                                                 
17 R. at 13 and 19-20. 
18 R. at 13, 21-24, and 152-154. 
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 A portion of the property owned by the Shaffers was enclosed by a fence, because it had 
been used for several years as a pasture by the Almonds.  (See Shaffer Affidavit.)19   
 Craig and Sue Shaffer decided to split the property into two pieces with one piece being 
the area enclosed by the fence (hereafter the “Talbot Property”), and the remainder being the 
other piece (hereafter the “Nielson Property”).  (See Shaffer Affidavit and Plaintiff’s 
Complaint.)20 
 On or about January 17, 1985, Craig and Sue Shaffer sold the property enclosed by the 
fence, the Talbot Property, to Suel Murdock and Gae Murdock by Quit Claim Deed which was 
recorded as Instrument No. 168360.  (See Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exhibit “J” and Shaffer 
Affidavit.)21 
 In selling the Talbot Property to Suel Murdock and Gae Murdock, it was agreed between 
the Shaffers and the Murdocks that the Murdocks were purchasing all of the property enclosed 
by the fence (the Talbot Property).  The Shaffers agreed with the Murdocks that the fenceline 
would be the property boundary line which divided the Talbot Property from the Nielson 
Property.  (See Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)22 
 To separate the properties, the Shaffers and the Murdocks then jointly created a legal 
description for the Talbot Property that was included in the Deed from the Shaffers to the 
                                                 
19 R. at 152-154. 
20 R. at 13-14, and 152-154.  
21 R. at 13-14, 40-41, and 152-154. 
22 R. at 147-148, and 152-154. 
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Murdocks which the Shaffers and the Murdocks all believed reflected their agreement of having 
the fenceline be the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property.  (See 
Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)23 
 The fenceline was maintained as the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the 
Nielson Property by the Shaffers and the Murdocks the entire time that these parties owned their 
respective properties, as described above.  (See Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)24 
 On September 22, 1986, Dr. Phil Cromwell and Sherry Cromwell, (hereafter the 
“Cromwells”) obtained the Nielson property from the Shaffers which was subsequently then 
deeded in turn to the Heaps, the Parkers and then finally to the Plaintiffs/Appellants.  This was 
accomplished by the Deeds attached to Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Complaint as Exhibits “D”, “E”, 
“F”, “G” and “H” which are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully.25  A summary 
of these transfers of ownership of the Nielson property is also contained in the Timeline of 
Ownership of the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property attached to the Erickson Affidavit as 
Exhibit “4”.26 
 When the Cromwells purchased the Nielson property, the property next door (the Talbot 
Property) was pasture land with a fence that created a boundary between the Nielson Property 
and the pasture land (the Talbot Property).  A legal description was included in the Deed to the 
                                                 
23 R. at 147-148, and 152-154. 
24 R. at 147-148, and 152-154. 
25 R. at 25-37. 
26 R. at 406-514, and specifically 410.  
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Cromwells that they believed reflected the fenceline as the boundary line between their property 
(the Nielson Property) and the property owned by the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) on the 
other side of the fence.  After purchasing the Nielson Property, the Cromwells immediately 
began watering and maintaining the grass and yard up to the fenceline.  On the other side of the 
fence, the property owned by the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) was bare dirt, weeds, and 
pasture.  (See Affidavit of Phil Cromwell, hereafter the “Cromwell Affidavit”).27 
 Dr. Cromwell personally planted a number of lilac bushes on the Nielson Property up to 
the fenceline to create a sort of natural privacy barrier between the properties.  These lilac bushes 
were planted along the boundary line between the Nielson property and the property owned by 
the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) towards the front and extending down the boundary line 
approximately a to ½ of the way.  Dr. Cromwell then personally maintained the grass, lilac 
bushes and yard up to the fenceline for several years.  (See Cromwell Affidavit.)28 
 In August 1992, the Murdocks sold their pasture land surrounded by the fence (the Talbot 
Property) to Vince Whitehead.29  Mr. Whitehead took down the fence and immediately built a 
home which he then sold to Dave & Brenda Larsen in February 1993.30  When Mr. Whitehead 
sold the property to the Larsens, the home was completed but no landscaping had been done.31  
At this time a clear boundary line existed between the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property 
                                                 
27 R. at 398-402.  
28 R. at 398-402. 
29 R. at 148. 
30 R. at 399 and 403. 
31 R. at 404.  
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because there were lilac bushes and maintained yard and grass on the Nielson property and bare 
dirt on Mr. Whitehead’s property (the Talbot property).  (See Cromwell Affidavit.)32 
 After purchasing his property in February 1993, Mr. Larsen and Dr. Cromwell discussed 
his landscaping of his property (the Nielson Property) up to the boundary line that had been 
defined by the previous fence.  At the time of this conversation a clear boundary line established 
by the fence still existed between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property because of the 
lilac bushes, groomed grass and yard that Dr. Cromwell had maintained up to the fence line, and 
the bare ground that was on Mr. Larsen’s property (the Talbot Property).  (See Cromwell 
Affidavit.)33 
 A legal description was included in the Deed for the Larsens that they believed reflected 
the clear boundary line that existed between their property (Talbot property) and the Cromwell’s 
property (Neilson property).  (See Affidavit of Dave Larsen, hereafter Larsen Affidavit.)   
 Mr. Larsen then installed a sprinkler system and grass up to the boundary line of the 
Cromwell’s lilac bushes, grass and yard essentially landscaping all of the bare ground and 
continuing the boundary line between the Nielson property and the Talbot property.  (See Larsen 
Affidavit.)34 
 After this was done, Mr. Larsen maintained his yard (the Talbot Property) and 
Dr. Cromwell maintained his yard (the Nielson Property) for several years.  The boundary line 
                                                 
32 R. at 399. 
33 R. at 399. 
34 R. at 403-405. 
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between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property was always exactly where the fence had 
been the entire time the Cromwells owned the Nielson property and the Larsens owned the 
Talbot property.  (See Cromwell Affidavit.)35 
 While they owned the Talbot Property, the Larsens also built a shed on the back corner.  
The shed was built so that the back side of it was on the boundary line.  (See Cromwell and 
Larsen Affidavits.)36 
 The Talbots purchased the Talbot Property from the Larsens on August 11, 1995.  At this 
time, the boundary line between the properties was well defined by the lilac bushes, grass, yards, 
sprinkler system, and shed that existed on the Talbot property or the Cromwell’s property 
(Neilson property).  (See Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibit “L”, Michele Talbot Affidavit, Robert 
Talbot Affidavit, Cromwell Affidavit and Larsen Affidavit.)37 
 A legal description was included in the Deed for the Talbot’s property that they believed 
reflected the boundary line between our property and the Cromwell’s property that was well 
defined by the lilac bushes, grass, yards, sprinkler system, and shed that existed on either our 
property or the Cromwell’s property (Nielson property). (See Robert Talbot Affidavit.)38 
 The Talbots and the Cromwells then discussed the Talbots installing a carport on their 
property up to the boundary line, next to the lilac bushes.  They discussed how the carport would 
                                                 
35 R. at 398-402. 
36 R. at 398-402, and 403-405 respectively.  
37 R. at 44-45, 149-151, 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405.   
38 R. at 384-397. 
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look.  They also discussed that it would be on the boundary line between the properties, right 
next to the lilac bushes that the Cromwells had planted.  After discussing this, the Cromwells 
gave their permission to allow the Talbots to build the carport as described.  (See Robert Talbot 
and Cromwell Affidavits.)39 
 The Talbots installed the driveway and carport just as we had discussed.  (See Robert 
Talbot Affidavit and photographs attached as Exhibits “1”, “2”, and “3”.)40 
 The Cromwells lived on their property (the Nielson Property) for nearly 20 years.  The 
Talbots were the Cromwells neighbors for nearly 10 years.  During all of this time the boundary 
line that existed between the Cromwells (the Nielson Property) and the Talbot Property was 
always the same and was defined by the fence, or once it was removed, by the lilacs, grass, 
yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that took its place.  Every neighbor the 
Cromwells had that lived on the Talbot property, including the Talbots, agreed to the boundary 
line through their maintenance of the boundary line.  There was never any dispute about the 
boundary line between the properties.  (See Cromwell Affidavit.)41 
 On July 2, 2004, the Cromwells’ sold their property (the Nielson Property) to Jared 
Heaps & Marisa Heaps.  Who owned the property for about 2 years.  The Heaps then sold the 
property (the Nielson Property) to the Parkers on August 17, 2006.  The Talbots and their 
neighbors, the Heaps and the Parkers all maintained the boundary line as established by the 
                                                 
39 R. at 384-397, and 398-402. 
40 R. at 384-397.  
41 R. at 398-402.  
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lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport.  There was never any dispute 
or disagreement about the boundary line between the properties.42   
 The Parkers sold the Nielson property to the Plaintiffs/Appellants in August 2013.  (See 
Plaintiffs Complaint.)43 
 In June 2014, the Plaintiffs/Appellants became the owners of the Nielson Property 
adjacent to that of the Talbot Property.  Immediately upon obtaining ownership, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants claimed to have learned that the legal description they obtained through 
their warranty deed entitled them to those portions of the Talbot Property that have the 
Defendants’ sprinkler system, shrubs and/or trees and also has the shed and the carport on them.  
The Plaintiffs/Appellants, became irate and demanded that the Talbots remove all of these 
improvements from the property.  (See Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Complaint and Michele Talbot 
Affidavit.)44 
 Before this, there was never any dispute about the boundary line of the Talbot Property 
and the Nielson Property between the Talbots or any of their neighbors until nearly 20 years after 
the Talbots purchased their property.  (See Robert Talbot Affidavit.)45 
                                                 
42 R. at 386.  
43 R. at 12.  
44 R. at 12, and 149-151.  
45 R. at 384-397. 
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 In August 2014, Cheryl Nielson began cutting down the lilac bushes that had been part of 
the boundary line the entire time both the Cromwells and the Talbots had lived in their respective 
properties.  (See Cromwell Affidavit and Robert Talbot Affidavit.)46 
 Photographs show how the lilac bushes looked for many years, and also how the property 
looked after the lilac bushes were cut down.  (See Robert Talbot Affidavit and attached Exhibits 
“1”, “2”, and “3”.)47 
 Photographs also show the location of the driveway, carport and shed that are located on 
the Talbot property, and which were part of the boundary line that was first established by the 
fence when it existed.  (See Affidavit of Robert Talbot with attached Exhibits “1”, “2”, and “3”, 
and Affidavits of Cromwell, and Larsen.)48 
 These same photographs also accurately show the boundary line as established by the 
lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that were maintained from the 
beginning of the time the properties were divided by a fence and as the boundary line existed 
thereafter for over 20 years.  (See Affidavit of Robert Talbot with attached Exhibits “1”, “2”, and 
“3”, and Affidavits of  Cromwell, and Larsen.)49 
 A timeline of Ownership of the Talbot property and the Nielson property is provided to 
the Court as a visual aid in understanding the establishing and maintaining of the boundary line 
                                                 
46 R. at 284-397 and 398-402.  
47 R. at 384-397. 
48 R. at 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405.  
49 R. at 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405. 
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between the properties that first began with the fence and then continued with the lilacs, grass, 
yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport.  Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit 
“4”.50 
 The Parkers also testified that they did not know that the legal description written on the 
Warranty Deed to the property they sold to the Plaintiffs was different from the boundary line 
established by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport.  The Parkers 
believed and treated the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport as the 
boundary line.  (See Second Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit “5” pages 9, 13; and Exhibit 
“6” pages 15 – 18, 22, 35 – 36, 39, 41 – 42.)51 
 The Parkers stated that they believed the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, 
driveway and carport as the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the land they owned 
(the Nielson Property) based upon their seeing these things for themselves and based upon their 
conversations with Jared and Marissa Heaps from whom they purchased the Nielson Property.  
(See Second Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit “6” pages 46-48.)52 
  
                                                 
50 R. at 410. 
51 R. at 406-514. 
52 R. at 406-514. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
 The following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Plaintiffs/Appellants in 
the Appellants’ Brief: 
1. Whether the District Court properly found that there were no genuine issues of 
fact that would preclude summary judgment from being entered in favor of either 
the Talbots or the Parkers?   
2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Talbots concerning the boundary between the Talbot Property and the Nielson 
Property? 
3. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Parkers who provided to the Plaintiffs/Appellants a warranty deed containing a 
metes and bounds legal description? 
4.  Whether the District Court property ruled against the Plaintiffs/Appellants on 
their Motion to Disqualify the counsel of the Talbots and Parkers.   
 In addition, the Talbots and Parkers identify the following issue on appeal:  Whether 
Respondents Talbots and Parkers are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? 
  
17 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The summary judgment rendered by the District Court in favor of the Respondents 
Talbots and Parkers was proper.  Summary Judgment is appropriate when “. . . the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter 
of law.”  State v. Rubbermaid, 129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765, 
769 (1991). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the 
elements challenged by the moving party.  Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 
530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994).  It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a 
genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than just 
conclusory assertions, or assumptions or beliefs that an issue of material fact exists.  Van Velson 
Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, (1994).  “Rather, the 
[opposing party] must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 
473, 478 (1994).  
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element 
essential to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial.  This 
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56(c) of the 
18 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Rule 56(c).  See, Badell v. 
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1998).  In Cellotex, Justice Renquist wrote for the majority and 
explained: 
 The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after 
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.  In such a 
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.  The moving party is entitled to a 
Judgment as a matter of law . . .  477 U.S. at 322-323. 
 
As a result of Cellotex, the Appellant in this case cannot raise merit-less claims to defeat 
Summary Judgment.  Rather the Appellant must introduce or point to facts in the record that 
support each element of each claim asserted in Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint.  
In the present case the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Respondents Talbots and Parkers.  The relevant facts, which are cited above and are on the 
record before this Court evidence that there was an agreement between the original landowners 
concerning where the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property would 
be when the original property was divided.53  These original landowners created a deed with a 
legal description that they believed reflected the agreement for the boundary line that they had 
                                                 
53 R. at 147-148, and 152-154. 
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made which at that time was reflected by a fence.54  The record evidences that the agreed upon 
boundary line was always maintained by every owner of the properties through items such as the 
fence, lilac bushes, grass, yards, a sprinkler system, a shed, a driveway and a carport from the 
time that the property was divided until ownership ended up in the hands of the Talbots and the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants several decades later.55   
The Plaintiffs/Appellants attempted to create an issue of fact with the District Court to 
preclude summary judgment by submitting the Affidavits of Craig Shaffer and Vince 
Whitehead.56  However, the Talbots and the Parkers also obtained affidavits from Craig Shaffer 
and Vince Whitehead.57  These additional affidavits contained much more testimony from these 
witnesses concerning the relevant facts.  These additional affidavits evidence that there are no 
genuine issues of fact.   
Additionally, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempted to create issues of fact through the 
Affidavits of the Plaintiffs/Appellants themselves.58  However, a review of these Affidavits 
actually supports the notice that the Plaintiffs/Appellants had about the agreed upon boundary 
line.  These affidavits describe the shed on one end of the property, the driveway, carport and 
lilacs on the other end of the property and the sprinklers, grass and lawn in between those two 
                                                 
54 R. at 147-148, and 152-154. 
55 R. at 410 (as a summary). 
56 R. at 231-232, and 250-251.   
57 R. at 152-154, and 601-603.   
58 R. at 181-183, 227-228, and 567-568.   
20 
 
ends.  The Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claim that they could not see a boundary line is disingenuous 
when all of their testimony is read together.   
Under these undisputed facts and the applicable law provided to the District Court at 
summary judgment and again to this Court herein, there are no issues of material fact.  The 
undisputed facts provide evidence that the legal boundary line between the Talbot Property and 
the Nielson Property remains where it was agreed upon, and where it has been maintained by 
every land owner for more than 30 years.59 
In response, Plaintiffs/Appellants have provided no additional evidence on the record 
upon which either the District Court nor this Court could rely to refute the evidence provided by 
the Talbots and Parkers.  Rather, the Plaintiffs/Appellants simply attempt to convince this Court 
that a different law should apply.   
The District Court properly recognized that Plaintiffs/Appellants had failed to meet their 
burden of “showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”60  The District Court 
properly found that Plaintiffs/Appellants relied upon inapplicable law and had provided no facts 
or evidence on the record to contradict the law and the evidence provided by the Talbots and 
Parkers.61  As a result, the District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Talbots and 
Parkers.62   
                                                 
59 R. at 410 (as a summary). 
60 R. at 637-650. 
61 R. at 637-650. 
62 R. at 651-652. 
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All of Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claims in their Complaint fail.  There are no remaining valid 
causes of action for Plaintiffs/Appellants to pursue, and the dismissal Plaintiffs/Appellants’ 
Complaint and this litigation by the District Court was proper.  This Court should likewise rule 
in favor of the Talbots and Parkers and should award them their attorneys fees and costs on 
appeal as a result of the frivolous arguments of law made by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.   
 
II. THIS IS NOT A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CASE  
 
The District Court properly determined that the present case is not a “boundary by 
acquiescence” case when it relied upon this Court’s previous decisions and awarded summary 
judgment to the Talbots and Parkers.  According to this Court in a previous similar case, “the 
fundamental principle underlying all of the rules of construction of deeds, as well as all other 
contractual instruments, is that the courts must seek and give effect to the intention of the 
parties.”  Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 89, 245 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1952).  The general rule 
is that monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on the ground, control over calls for 
courses and distances.  Id.   
The facts in the present case are similar to those of Campbell.  In Campbell, the legal 
description in a deed for property that was divided up by the original owner and the recipient of 
one part of the property did not accurately reflect the agreement between the parties of where the 
boundary line between the divided properties would be.  Subsequent litigation ensued with one 
party claiming the legal description controlled the boundary line and the other party arguing that 
the agreement between them controlled the boundary line.  In analyzing the facts this Court 
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determined that there was no dispute that a line was agreed upon and marked on the ground 
between the parties.  After determining these facts, this Court specifically held, “the particular 
rule applicable here is that where the seller and the buyer go upon the land and there agree upon 
and mark the boundary between the part to be conveyed and the part to be retained by the seller, 
the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances set out in the deed.”  Campbell, 73 Idaho at 
89, 245 P.2d at 1057. 
 In a subsequent similar case, where the parties that were litigating were successors to the 
original owners of the property that had been divided, this Court further declared that an agreed 
upon boundary established under the Campbell ruling, “would also be binding upon a successor 
in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement.”  Paurley v. Harris, 75 
Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954).  In defining what actually provides notice of the 
agreement to successors of the seller this Court specifically stated, 
The boundary, which defendants claim, was clearly marked by a ‘tight board 
fence,’ four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants’ side of the fence 
was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees.  This would constitute notice to an 
intending purchaser, of defendants’ possession.  One buying property in the 
possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of title or right of 
possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal.   
 
Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389, 393 94 P.3d 694, 698 (2004).  
 The facts in the present case fit the above cited case law precisely evidencing that this is 
not a “boundary by acquiescence” case as argued by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.  In the present 
case, the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property were originally one parcel of property that 
was divided up by the owners Craig and Sue Shaffer, who retained a part of the original property 
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(the Nielson Property) and then separated and sold the separated property (the Talbot Property) 
to Suel and Gae Murdock.  (Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits and Plaintiffs’ Complaint.)63  When 
this separation of property occurred, the Talbot Property was enclosed by a standing fence.  
(Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)64   
Further, the record evidences that the Shaffers and the Murdocks specifically agreed and 
both testified that the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property would 
be the existing fence.  (Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)65  Additionally, both testify that a deed 
was drafted based upon the belief of the Shaffers and the Murdocks that the legal description in 
the deed accurately described their agreed upon boundary line as represented by the fence.  
(Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)66   
Over several decades the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property were sold to other 
groups of individuals.  (See Plaintiff’s Complaint and attached Exhibits.)67  During this time 
there was always either the fence or other “monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on 
the ground” that acted as the boundary between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property.  
This is evidenced by the fence, and by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway 
and carport that were established and took the fence’s place when it was removed.  (See 
Affidavits of Shaffer, Murdock, Robert Talbot, Cromwell, Larsen, and the depositions of Paul 
                                                 
63 R. at 10-45, 152-154, and 147-148. 
64 R. at 147-148 and 152-154. 
65 R. at 147-148 and 152-154. 
66 R. at 147-148 and 152-154. 
67 R. at 10-45. 
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and Saundra Parker).68  Based upon the undisputed record before the Court, established by the 
Affidavits and testimony of the owners of the property, there was always an agreed upon 
boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property beginning with the fence, or 
once it was removed, by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that 
took the fence’s place.  (See the Timeline of Ownership attached as Exhibit 4 to the Second 
Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson.)69 
When the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased the Nielson Property about 30 years after the 
boundary line was established, these same the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, 
driveway and carport existed that continued the established boundary line.  However, the 
Plaintiffs checked the legal description and learned that the Talbot Property actually encroached 
upon the legal description of property listed on their deed by about 12 or so feet.  (See Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint.)70  As a result, the Plaintiffs ripped out all of the lilacs, shrubs and plants and then 
demanded that the Talbots move their shed, sprinkler system and carport to give them the land 
they claimed the legal description on their deed stated they owned.  (See Michele Talbot 
Affidavit, and Affidavit of Robert Talbot with Exhibits “1” “2”, and “3”.)71  The Talbots refused 
stating that the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property was where 
                                                 
68 R. at 152-154, 147-148, 384-397, 398-402, 403-405, 414, and 425-430. 
69 R. at 406-514, and specifically Exhibit “4” at 409-410.  
70 R. at 10-45. 
71 R. at 149-151, and 384-397. 
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all previous owners had always established it to be based upon the fenceline, lilacs, grass, yards, 
sprinkler system and structures existed for decades.72   
 The facts on the record in the present case are undisputed.73  The general rule set forth by 
this Court’s Campbell, decision is concise and unmistakable.  Based on these facts it is frivolous 
for the Plaintiffs/Appellants to claim that any “boundary by acquiescence” law applies in this 
appeal.  Plaintiffs/Appellants received the Talbots’ and the Parkers’ brief in support of their 
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.74  This brief clearly set forth the narrow line of cases 
that support the applicable law, including the general rule set forth in Campbell.75  
Plaintiffs/Appellants have had adequate time to analyze and review this Court’s Campbell, 
Paurley, and Reid, decisions.  They cannot claim that they did not know about these cases.  They 
also cannot claim that they did not know what the undisputed facts were.  Despite all of this, the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants frivolously persist in continuing to argue that the “boundary by 
acquiescence” cases apply even when they know that these cases are not applicable.  This Court 
should deny the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ appeal.  This is not a case where the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
can make a legitimate argument for an application of any law other than that set forth above.  
Based upon the frivolous arguments of law made by the Plaintiffs/Appellants, this Court should 
                                                 
72 R. at 149-151, and 384-397. 
73 R. at 147-148, 149, 151, 152-154, 384-397, 398-402, 403-405, 406-514, 423-447, 601-603, 
summarized at 401.  
74 R. at 383.   
75 R. at 373-375. 
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enter an award of attorney fees in favor of the Talbots and the Parkers and against the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants.   
 
A. LEGAL DESCRIPTION DOES NOT CONTROL THE BOUNDARY LINE 
 
 Plaintiffs/Appellants argument that the legal description in the deed they received from 
the Parkers should control the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson 
Property fails when held up to the applicable law.  In applying this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, 
and Reid, decisions to the facts cited above the boundary line between the Talbot Property and 
the Nielson Property is established to be where the original parties agreed it was, regardless of 
the contrary legal description on the deed.  This agreement and the boundary line was evidenced 
by the original fence and by the location of the lilacs, grass, yard, sprinkler system, shed, 
driveway and carport.  This agreement and the boundary line was followed for over 30 years by 
all of the previous owners of both properties.   
 The Plaintiffs/Appellants’ arguments that the legal description should control and/or that 
a different law should apply are immaterial.  This Court has established the applicable law.  As a 
result of the undisputed facts set forth on the record, this Court should apply the law that is 
represented by this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions.  This is not a case where the 
law of “boundary by acquiescence” is applicable.  Likewise, this is not a case where the legal 
description controls the boundary line.  Rather, this is a case that must follow this Court’s 
previously declared narrow line of cases that apply when the original owner divides the property 
and agrees with the buyer about the boundary line.  The District Court’s decision that the 
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boundary line between the properties remains where it existed for over 30 years despite the 
contrary legal description should be upheld.  Plaintiffs/Appellants’ should be denied.  
 
B.  EVIDENCE OF NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS ABOUT THE 
EXISTING BOUNDARY 
 
 Plaintiffs/Appellants argument that there is no evidence of their knowledge of the 
existing boundary line also fails.  As was set forth above, this Court declared that an agreed upon 
boundary established under the Campbell ruling, “would also be binding upon a successor in 
interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement.”  Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 
112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954).  In defining what actually provides notice of the agreement 
to successors of the seller this Court specifically stated, 
The boundary, which defendants claim, was clearly marked by a ‘tight board 
fence,’ four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants’ side of the fence 
was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees.  This would constitute notice to an 
intending purchaser, of defendants’ possession.  One buying property in the 
possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of title or right of 
possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal.   
 
Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389, 393 94 P.3d 694, 698 (2004). 
In the present case, the “notice” the Plaintiffs/Appellants received concerning the agreed 
upon boundary line was provided by the location of the lilacs, grass, yard, sprinkler system, shed, 
driveway and carport that existed creating a boundary line between the Talbot Property and the 
Nielson Property when the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased the Nielson Property.  The 
Plaintiffs/Appellants did not even need to conduct a “reasonable investigation.”  The boundary 
line was obvious.  The lilacs, driveway and carport on the front end, the sprinklers, grass and 
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yard in the middle and the shed on the other end created an observable and recognizable 
boundary line.  The “notice” required by Reid, was provided.   
With the evidence and record before this Court, the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ argument that 
they didn’t have “knowledge” of the agreed upon boundary line is unreasonable.  The record 
establishes an agreed upon boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property 
that existed for decades.  The record also establishes that the Plaintiffs/Appellants had notice 
sufficient to satisfy the Reid, requirements.   
Based upon the actual applicable cases, and the record, this Court should enter an Order 
upholding the District Court’s summary judgment decision in favor of the Talbots and the 
Parkers.  Further, this Court should enter an Order which defines the boundary line between the 
Talbot Property and the Nielson Property to be exactly where all of the previous parties agreed 
and maintained it to be.  For these reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal 
and enter a decision in favor of the Talbots and the Parkers.  
 
 
III. THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS WARRANTY OF TITLE CLAIM MUST FAIL 
Because the boundary between the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property is 
established by Idaho law, as set forth in Section II above, Plaintiff’s warranty of title or duty to 
defend claim against the Parkers should be dismissed.  In the present case, the District Court 
applied the correct law and found that the Campbell case controlled the boundary line between 
the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property.  The District Court also correctly determined that 
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the Warranty of Title claim of the Plaintiffs/Appellants failed due to this Court’s Paurley, 
decision.   
 In applying the Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, the Plaintiffs/Appellants are 
successors in interest with notice of the agreement that altered or changed the meets and bounds 
descriptions in the original written deeds.  These same meets and bounds descriptions have been 
handed down between all of the successors in interest to both the Nielson Property and the 
Talbot Property.  Under this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, all of the successor 
deeds, including that received by the Plaintiffs/Appellants from the Parkers, were altered and/or 
changed by the agreed upon boundary evidenced and followed by all previous owners of the 
properties.  For this reason, the Warranty Deed provided to the Plaintiffs/Appellants by the 
Parkers, in its changed state, is accurate and cannot be the source of any claim for Breach of 
Warranty of Title and/or Duty to Defend in favor of the Plaintiffs/Appellants.  As a result, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants’ appeal of the District Court’s decision concerning their claim of Warranty 
of Title against the Parkers should be denied.   
 
IV. PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS’ CLAIM TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL MUST FAIL 
 
 As with all previous claims and arguments, Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claim that counsel for 
the Talbots and the Parkers must be disqualified due to an alleged conflict is not supported by the 
facts or the law and should therefore be denied.  The applicable laws as set forth in this Court’s 
Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, which are analyzed above, all evidence that there are no 
conflicts of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers in the present case.   
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 However, even if there was a conflict of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants conducted the deposition of the Parkers and there learned that the Parkers 
and the Talbots had agreed to work together on this matter, thereby eliminating any such conflict 
of interest.76  Additionally, during these same depositions, as counsel for the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants was inquiring about why the Parkers had not defended the Nielsons against 
the claims brought by the Talbots, testimony was provided that claimed the attorney client 
privilege.77  The Parkers testified that they had had several discussions and meetings with the 
Talbots where they all agreed to work together to resolve the claims of the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
because they were all in agreement of what the boundary line was between the Talbot Property 
and the Nielson Property.78   
 The Talbots and the Parkers acknowledge that if this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and 
Reid, decisions did not exist, and the undisputed facts in this case were not as they are, then there 
might be a conflict between them.  However, this is not the case.  The law is straight forward.  
The facts concerning the boundary line are not in dispute.  The facts and the law both evidence 
that there is no conflict of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers.  To claim that there is a 
conflict of interest when there is no support in either the law or the facts is frivolous.  Worse, to 
claim that the “boundary by acquiescence” laws create a conflict of interest is an intentional 
                                                 
76 R. at 428 (depo page 20 lines 4-9).  
77 R. at 430 (depo pages 28-29). 
78 R. at 431-432.   
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effort to mislead this Court.  For these reasons, this Court should deny the appeal of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants and award attorneys fees and costs to the Talbots and the Parkers.  
 
 
V. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
 Respondents Talbots and Parkers are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on 
appeal pursuant to applicable Idaho law.  According to the relevant and applicable sections of 
Idaho Code § 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) the Idaho Supreme Court “may award reasonable 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  Further, Rule 11 of the 
I.A.R requires every party to represent to the Court that every pleading, written motion, or other 
paper that is filed “is not interposed for any improper purpose.”  Further this Rule requires every 
party to represent to the Court that its appeal and the arguments made therein are “warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose.”  I.A.R.  Rule 11(a).  When there is a violation 
of this rule, the Court can impose an appropriate sanction, including an order to pay the other 
parties’ reasonable attorney fees.  I.A.R.  Rule 11(a).   
In the present case, in their appeal, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempt to do the same thing 
that was done before the District Court, which is to unreasonably insist and try and convince this 
Court to apply law that is clearly not applicable under the relevant facts and circumstances of this 
case.  Further, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempt to convince this Court, just as it attempted to 
convince the District Court, that the District Court was required to disqualify the Talbots' and 
Parkers' attorney pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal and arguments have been brought frivolously, unreasonably and 
without a foundation or basis in applicable law. The Plaintiffs/ Appellants have made no 
arguments in their appeal for the "extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Rather, 
the Plaintiffs/Appellants simply try to force non-applicable law into this case, even after having 
had ample and adequate time to fully analyze the law that does apply. For these reasons, the 
Court should find the Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal to be unreasonable and frivolous, that the 
Talbots and Parkers are the prevailing parties and award the Talbots and Parkers their attorney 
fees and costs from this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the District Court's Decisions 
granting summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs/Appellants' motion for reconsideration in 
favor of the Talbots and the Parkers be affnmed in their entirety. Further, the Talbots and the 
Parkers respectfully request that they be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this ih day of September, 2017. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
& BUDGE, CHARTERED 
LANE V. ERICKSON, of the finn 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ih day of September, 2017, I served two true and 
correct copies of the above and foregoing document to the paiiies listed as follows: 
Blake S. Atkin 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
[ X] U. S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
LANE V. ERICKSON 
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